| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
06906nam a2200457 i 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
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| control field |
01145/2611399 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
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| control field |
APU |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
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| control field |
20221028154438.0 |
| 007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
cr cn |||m|||a |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
150428s2014 nyua fob 000 0deng d |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
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| International Standard Book Number |
9781627054782 |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
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| International Standard Book Number |
9781627054799 |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
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| Cancelled/invalid ISBN |
9781627054775 |
| 035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER |
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| System control number |
(OCoLC)908155788 |
| 035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER |
|---|
| System control number |
(CaBNVSL)swl00404864 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
|---|
| Original cataloging agency |
CaBNVSL |
| Language of cataloging |
eng |
| Transcribing agency |
APU |
| Modifying agency |
SF |
| 050 #4 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
QA76.9.A25 |
| Item number |
P27 2014eb |
| 082 04 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
005.8 |
| Edition number |
23 |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Parno, Bryan., |
| 9 (RLIN) |
47376 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Trust extension as a mechanism for secure code execution on commodity computers |
| Medium |
[electronic resources] / |
| Statement of responsibility, etc |
Bryan Jeffrey Parno. |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
[San Rafael, California]: |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc |
Morgan & Claypool Publishers, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc |
c2014. |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
1 PDF (xvii, 188 pages) : |
| Other physical details |
illustrations. |
| 490 1# - SERIES STATEMENT |
|---|
| Series statement |
ACM books ; |
| Volume number/sequential designation |
#2 |
| 504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE |
|---|
| Bibliography, etc |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 173-188). |
| 505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
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| Formatted contents note |
1. Introduction -- 1.1 Insecure computers in a hostile world -- 1.2 A vision for a better world -- 1.3 Overview: building up from a firm foundation -- 1.4 Bootstrapping trust in a commodity computer -- 1.5 Securely executing code on a commodity computer -- 1.6 Leveraging secure code execution to improve network protocols -- 1.7 Secure code execution despite untrusted software and hardware -- 1.8 Summary of contributions -- |
| 505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
|---|
| Formatted contents note |
2. Background and related work in trust establishment -- 2.1 What do we need to know? Techniques for recording platform state -- 2.1.1 Recording code identity -- 2.1.2 Recording dynamic properties -- 2.1.3 Which property is necessary? -- 2.2 Can we use platform information locally? -- 2.2.1 Secure boot -- 2.2.2 Storage access control based on code identity -- 2.3 Can we use platform information remotely? -- 2.3.1 Prerequisites -- 2.3.2 Conveying code measurement chains -- 2.3.3 Privacy concerns -- 2.4 How do we make sense of platform state? -- 2.4.1 Coping with information overload -- 2.4.2 Focusing on security-relevant code -- 2.4.3 Conveying higher-level information -- 2.5 Roots of trust -- 2.5.1 General-purpose tamper-resistant and tamper-responding devices -- 2.5.2 General-purpose devices without dedicated physical defenses -- 2.5.3 Special-purpose minimal devices -- 2.5.4 Research solutions without hardware support -- 2.5.5 Cryptographic protocols -- 2.6 Validating the process -- 2.7 Applications -- 2.7.1 Real world -- 2.7.2 Research proposals -- 2.8 Human factors and usability -- 2.8.1 Trustworthy verifier device -- 2.8.2 Using your brain to check a computer -- 2.8.3 Pairing two trustworthy devices -- 2.9 Limitations -- 2.9.1 Load-time vs. run-time guarantees -- 2.9.2 Hardware attacks -- 2.10 Additional reading -- 2.11 Summary -- |
| 505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
|---|
| Formatted contents note |
3. Bootstrapping trust in a commodity computer -- 3.1 Problem definition -- 3.1.1 Informal problem description -- 3.1.2 Formal model -- 3.2 Potential solutions -- 3.2.1 Removing network access -- 3.2.2 Eliminating malware -- 3.2.3 Establishing a secure channel -- 3.3 Preferred solutions -- 3.4 Summary -- |
| 505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
|---|
| Formatted contents note |
4. On-demand secure code execution on commodity computers -- 4.1 Problem definition -- 4.1.1 Adversary model -- 4.1.2 Goals -- 4.2 Flicker architecture -- 4.2.1 Flicker overview -- 4.2.2 Isolated execution -- 4.2.3 Multiple flicker sessions -- 4.2.4 Interaction with a remote party -- 4.3 Developer's perspective -- 4.3.1 Creating a PAL -- 4.3.2 Automation -- 4.4 Flicker applications -- 4.4.1 Stateless applications -- 4.4.2 Integrity-protected state -- 4.4.3 Secret and integrity-protected state -- 4.5 Performance evaluation -- 4.5.1 Experimental setup -- 4.5.2 Microbenchmarks -- 4.5.3 Stateless applications -- 4.5.4 Integrity-protected state -- 4.5.5 Secret and integrity-protected state -- 4.5.6 Impact on suspended operating system -- 4.5.7 Major performance problems -- 4.6 Architectural recommendations -- 4.6.1 Launching a PAL -- 4.6.2 Hardware memory isolation -- 4.6.3 Hardware context switch -- 4.6.4 Improved TPM support for flicker -- 4.6.5 PAL exit -- 4.6.6 PAL life cycle -- 4.6.7 Expected impact -- 4.6.8 Extensions -- 4.7 Summary -- |
| 505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
|---|
| Formatted contents note |
5. Using trustworthy host-based information in the network -- 5.1 Problem definition -- 5.1.1 Architectural goals -- 5.1.2 Assumptions -- 5.2 The assayer architecture -- 5.2.1 Overview -- 5.2.2 Assayer components -- 5.2.3 Protocol details -- 5.2.4 User privacy and client revocation -- 5.3 Potential attacks -- 5.3.1 Exploited clients -- 5.3.2 Malicious clients -- 5.3.3 Rogue verifiers -- 5.3.4 Rogue filters -- 5.4 Case studies -- 5.4.1 Spam identification -- 5.4.2 Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) mitigation -- 5.4.3 Super-spreader worm detection -- 5.5 Implementation -- 5.5.1 Client architecture -- 5.5.2 Client verification -- 5.5.3 Traffic annotation -- 5.5.4 Filter -- 5.6 Evaluation -- 5.6.1 Client verification -- 5.6.2 Client annotations -- 5.6.3 Filter throughput -- 5.6.4 Internet-scale simulation -- 5.7 Potential objections -- 5.7.1 Why not collect information on the local router? -- 5.7.2 Is this really deployable incrementally? -- 5.8 Summary -- |
| 505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
|---|
| Formatted contents note |
6. Verifiable computing: secure code execution despite untrusted software and hardware -- 6.1 Overview -- 6.2 Cryptographic background -- 6.2.1 Yao's garbled circuit construction -- 6.2.2 The security of Yao's protocol -- 6.2.3 Fully homomorphic encryption -- 6.3 Problem definition -- 6.3.1 Basic requirements -- 6.3.2 Input and output privacy -- 6.3.3 Efficiency -- 6.4 An efficient verifiable-computation scheme with input and output privacy -- 6.4.1 Protocol definition -- 6.4.2 Proof of security -- 6.4.3 Proof of input and output privacy -- 6.4.4 Efficiency -- 6.5 How to handle cheating workers -- 6.6 Summary -- |
| 505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
|---|
| Formatted contents note |
7. Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Author's biography. |
| 506 ## - RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS NOTE |
|---|
| Terms governing access |
Abstract freely available; full-text restricted to subscribers or individual document purchasers. |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc |
As society rushes to digitize sensitive information and services, it is imperative that we adopt adequate security protections. However, such protections fundamentally conflict with the benefits we expect from commodity computers. In other words, consumers and businesses value commodity computers because they provide good performance and an abundance of features at relatively low costs. Meanwhile, attempts to build secure systems from the ground up typically abandon such goals, and hence are seldom adopted. |
| 538 ## - SYSTEM DETAILS NOTE |
|---|
| System details note |
Mode of access: World Wide Web. |
| 538 ## - SYSTEM DETAILS NOTE |
|---|
| System details note |
System requirements: Internet connectivity; World Wide Web browser and Adobe Acrobat Reader. |
| 650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Computer security. |
| 650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Computer networks |
| General subdivision |
Security measures. |
| 830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE |
|---|
| Uniform title |
ACM books ; |
| Volume number/sequential designation |
#2. |
| 9 (RLIN) |
47379 |
| 856 48 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
|---|
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://dl-acm-org.ezproxy.apu.edu.my/doi/book/10.1145/2611399 |
| Public note |
Available in ACM Digital Library. Requires Log In to view full text. |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
|
| Koha item type |
E-Book |
