000			02260cam a22003254a 4500
001			16961668
003			APU
005			20150813100650.0
008			110914s2012 enka b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2011038733
020			_a9781107096424 (hbk.)
040			_aDLC _cAPU _dBAHAR _dSM _beng
042			_apcc
050	0	0	_aQA76.9.M35 _bT36 2012
082	0	0	_a005.8 _223 _bTAM 2012
100	1		_aTambe, Milind. _d1965- _911339
245	1	0	_aSecurity and game theory : _balgorithms, deployed systems, lessons learned / _cMilind Tambe.
260			_aCambridge ; _aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _cc2012.
300			_axiv, 319 p. : _bill. ; _c24 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 297-310) and index.
520			_a"Global threats of terrorism, drug-smuggling and other crimes have led to a significant increase in research on game theory for security. Game theory provides a sound mathematical approach to deploy limited security resources to maximize their effectiveness. A typical approach is to randomize security schedules to avoid predictability, with the randomization using artificial intelligence techniques to take into account the importance of different targets and potential adversary reactions. This book distills the forefront of this research to provide the first and only study of long-term deployed applications of game theory for security for key organizations such as the Los Angeles International Airport police and the US Federal Air Marshals Service. The author and his research group draw from their extensive experience working with security officials to intelligently allocate limited security resources to protect targets, outlining the applications of these algorithms in research and the real world"--
650		0	_aComputer security. _976
650		0	_aGame theory. _911340
650		0	_aSecurity, Internatonal _xMathematical models. _911341
650		7	_aCOMPUTERS / Security / General. _2bisacsh _981
856	4	2	_3Cover image _uhttp://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/96424/cover/9781107096424.jpg
906			_a7 _bcbc _corignew _d1 _eecip _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2lcc _cBook
999			_c6110 _d6110